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THREE META-LESSONS GOVERNMENT AND 
INDUSTRY SHOULD LEARN FROM THE BP 
DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER AND 
WHY THEY WILL NOT 
Alyson C. Flournoy* 
Abstract: There are many law and policy lessons to be learned from the 
BP Deepwater Horizon disaster and its aftermath. Some are lessons spe-
cific to the BP oil well blowout. Regrettably, Congress has failed to enact 
even these critical reforms, although some important regulatory reforms 
have been adopted. This Article focuses on three broader lessons that this 
disaster should also teach, but that are very unlikely to be learned; lessons 
that could help to reduce the risk of future disasters. These meta-lessons 
suggest the need to: (1) learn from the next disaster—not the last one; (2) 
learn from the blueprint of the disaster; and (3) learn from the context of 
the disaster. However, both the limited scope of the reforms undertaken in 
the year since the disaster and the blueprint of the disaster highlight why 
government and industry are unlikely to learn these broader lessons. 
Introduction 
 On April 20, 2010, BP and its contractors had drilled the Macondo 
oil well in the Gulf of Mexico to its final depth of over 18,000 feet, and 
were cementing the well’s steel casing.1 A dangerous buildup of meth-
ane gas in the well rose to the surface, causing an explosion and fire 
that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, leading it to collapse 
and sink.2 Eleven workers from the rig were never found.3 The rest 
were evacuated, with seventeen suffering injuries.4 Oil began to leak 
into the Gulf. Repeated efforts to trigger the blowout preventer failed, 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2011, Alyson C. Flournoy, UF Research Foundation Professor & Alumni Research 
Scholar, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am grateful to Erin Ruff Riggs for her 
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1 See Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drill-
ing, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 1 
(2011) [hereinafter BP Commission Report], available at http://www.oilspillcommission. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf. 
2 See id. at vi, 1–18. 
3 See id. at vi. 
4 Campbell Robertson, Search Continues After Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2010, at 
A13. 
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leaving the well to gush oil, uncontrolled.5 Measures to collect some of 
the flow were ultimately successful.6 However, according to best esti-
mates, by the time the well was sealed roughly three months later, close 
to five million barrels of oil had flowed into the Gulf.7 
 This Article focuses on this series of events as a disaster. The term 
disaster is a useful descriptor and lens through which to view the events 
for several reasons. First, the term seems more apt than the terms “oil 
spill” and “blowout” that have frequently been used to describe the 
events and their aftermath.8 Neither of these terms captures the scale 
of the damage, nor provides any insight into the causes. If anything, 
both seem to suggest a technical failure and direct us to view the events 
through a technological lens. In contrast, the ordinary meaning of dis-
aster is an occurrence inflicting widespread destruction and distress.9 
The term disaster invites consideration of events broadly, through the 
lens of systems theory and other social science approaches that analyze 
disasters and the role that organizational learning plays in creating dis-
asters and their preconditions.10 This allows us to see that disasters 
caused by humans result not just from technical problems, but from a 
significant disruption or collapse of a community’s or organization’s 
cultural beliefs and norms about hazards.11 Rigid human and organiza-
tional beliefs and norms frequently collide with technical systems dur-
                                                                                                                      
5 BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 114–15. 
6 Id. at 159. 
7 The Amount and Fate of the Oil 18 (Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
& Offshore Drilling, Working Paper No. 3, 2011), available at http://www. oilspillcommis- 
sion.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Amount%20and%20Fate%20of%20th
e%20Oil%20Working%20Paper.pdf. 
8 See, e.g., William J. Broad, Taking Lessons from What Went Wrong, N.Y. Times, July 20, 
2010, at D1 (calling the incident the “worst offshore oil spill in United States history”);  
John M. Broder, Panel Points to Errors in Gulf Spill: Fatal Oil Well Explosion Was Avoidable, 
Report Says, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2011, at A14 (referring to the event as a “blowout and oil 
spill”). 
9 See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 643 (1986) (defining disas-
ter as “a sudden calamitous event producing great material damage, loss, or distress”). 
10 See Louise K. Comfort, Risk, Security, and Disaster Management, 8 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 
335, 338 (2005); N. Pidgeon & M. O’Leary, Man-made Disasters: Why Technology and Organi-
zations (Sometimes) Fail, 34 Safety Sci. 15, 15–16 (2000). Of course, the meaning of the 
term disaster is contested among social scientists. See G.A. Kreps, Sociological Inquiry and 
Disaster Research, 10 Ann. Rev. Soc. 309, 311 (1984). Kreps suggests that even when disas-
ters are defined by their harm to people and the physical environment, both the causes 
and consequences must be viewed as related to the social structures and processes of socie-
ties or communities involved in the disasters. Id. at 312. 
11 Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 16, 18; Brian Toft & Simon Reynolds, 
Learning from Disasters: A Management Approach 24–25 (3d ed. 2005). 
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ing unfolding disasters.12 Additionally, as one historian of engineering 
grimly noted, “‘[n]obody wants failures. But you also don’t want to let a 
good crisis go to waste.’”13 In that spirit, this Article sketches how we 
might learn from this disaster, and suggests some of the obstacles to this 
process. 
 There are many law and policy lessons to be learned from the BP 
Deepwater Horizon disaster and its aftermath.14 Part I briefly summa-
rizes the most specific law and policy lessons from the disaster, and sug-
gests that these are the lessons we are most likely to identify.15 However, 
the extent to which this learning will affect regulatory decision making 
is still not certain. Part II focuses on three meta-lessons that are perhaps 
even more important than narrow, specific lessons from the BP disas-
ter.16 Meta-lessons are lessons about how to learn: in this case, how to 
learn from any disaster. They require a look beyond the confines of the 
facts unique to a specific event to identify pervasive patterns in the law 
and policy framework that increase the risk of disaster. The Article 
identifies some major obstacles to learning these broader lessons, and 
concludes that despite their importance, it is unlikely such lessons will 
inform future decisions.17 
 These meta-lessons can be summarized as follows. First, it is crucial 
to anticipate the next possible disaster, not merely seek to avoid repeat-
ing the most recent one. This Article suggests how such an approach 
would differ from the current path of reactive reform, the value of a 
new approach, and why the United States is unlikely to pursue this 
path.18 Second, it is necessary to identify not just specific types of disas-
ters that may occur in the future, but the blueprint or architecture for 
this and other similar disasters—the economic, political, and regulatory 
context that facilitated the cascading errors that produced the disaster. 
I draw on a concept that Professor Rena Steinzor has elaborated in her 
work—the idea of hollow government—to describe the blueprint for 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 16. 
13 See Broad, supra note 8 (quoting Duke University Professor Henry Petroski, a histo-
rian of engineering and author of the 2006 book Success Through Failure). 
14 This Article focuses on the events leading up to the blowout and the efforts to con-
tain the gushing well, but not on the other failures that occurred in the spill response and 
clean up effort. Thus, I use the term disaster to refer to the causes and consequences of 
the blowout and the inability to staunch the gushing oil for three months. 
15 See infra Part I. 
16 See infra Part II.A–.C. 
17 See infra Parts II.A–.C, Conclusion. 
18 See infra Part II.A. 
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these disasters and the remedy.19 Although hollow government repre-
sents a pervasive and fundamental source of risk to health, safety, and 
the environment, Part II.B describes powerful forces that make it 
unlikely that the government will address this fundamental problem.20 
Finally, the Article suggests that the broader policy context of the na-
tional energy policy is a third important focus for learning. 21 The Arti-
cle concludes with some suggestions why it is unlikely that this disaster 
will serve as an impetus for government and industry to learn these 
meta-lessons. 
I. Narrow Lessons from the BP Disaster 
 Many of the lessons specific to the BP oil well blowout are lessons 
about technological and regulatory failures that contributed directly to 
the BP disaster and are largely uncontested. In the wake of the blowout, 
certain technical failures became rapidly apparent: the blowout pre-
venter (BOP), a critical safety component designed to shut off the well 
in the event of an imminent blowout, failed to operate properly.22 The 
numerous investigations undertaken in the wake of the spill23 have con-
firmed this and have provided ever greater detail on the inadequacies in 
the design of the specific BOP used, the possible causes of its failure,24 
                                                                                                                      
 
19 Rena I. Steinzor, Mother Earth and Uncle Sam: How Pollution and Hollow 
Government Hurt Our Kids 44 (2008). 
20 See infra Part II.B. 
21 See infra Part II.C. 
22 See BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 114–15. 
23 Numerous hearings were held by congressional committees throughout the summer 
of 2010. See Energy and Commerce Committee Investigates Deepwater Horizon Rig Oil Spill, Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce Democrats ( July 15, 2010), http://democrats.energycommerce. 
house.gov/index.php?q=news/energy-commerce-committee-investigates-deepwater-horizon-
rig-oil-spill. In addition, the executive branch initiated several investigations. See, e.g., BP 
Commission Report, supra note 1, at vi; Outer Cont’l Shelf Safety Oversight Bd., U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, Report to Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar 1 (2010) 
[hereinafter Interior OCS Safety Report], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/press 
releases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=43677. A report of the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS) and Coast Guard joint investigation is also anticipated in 2011. 
Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Official Site FAQ, Deepwater Horizon Joint Investiga-
tion, http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/page/3043/47459/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011). In addition to these investigations, ongoing tort litigation will likely reveal additional 
facts regarding the specific causes of the blowout. See John Schwartz, First the Spill, Then the 
Law Suits, N.Y. Times, June 11, 2010, at A14. 
24 For example, the BOP lacked a second blind shear ram as a backup, something that 
could have been installed on the Deepwater Horizon’s BOP, but was not. David Barstow et. 
al., Regulators Failed to Address Risk in Oil Rig Fail-Safe Device, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2010, at 
A1. The BOP also did not have a remote or acoustic trigger—devices that would have per-
mitted the crew to trigger the device even after the explosion and evacuation of the rig. 
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and the role of the casing and cementing practices in the failure.25 In 
addition, a series of operational decisions by BP and its contractors that 
compromised safety have come under increasing scrutiny.26 
 Although this Article’s primary focus is on law and policy lessons, it 
is important to note that these highly visible and concrete failures will 
likely lead industry to respond voluntarily by adopting some practices 
and procedures to avoid similar failures.27 From a law and governance 
perspective, however, simply allowing industry to learn voluntarily and 
police itself is widely viewed as inadequate for several reasons.28 Indeed, 
the regulatory environment that existed at the time of the blowout re-
                                                                                                                      
These acoustic triggers are required in Brazil and Norway and used by some oil companies 
even when not required by state authorities. See Russell Gold, Ben Casselman & Guy 
Chazan, Leaking Oil Well Lacked Safeguard Device, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 2010, at A1. When 
U.S. regulators considered requiring acoustic triggers, industry opposed them citing their 
unreliability. Id. Officials in Norway suggest they have been effective. Id. Ultimately MMS 
declined to require them, citing their expense. Id. 
25 See Ben Casselman & Russell Gold, Unusual Decisions Set Stage for BP Disaster, Wall St. J., 
May 27, 2010, at A1; Letter from Fred H. Bartlit, Jr. et al., to Nat’l Comm’n on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling (Oct. 28, 2010), available at http:// 
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/spilldoc.PDF; Letter from Henry A. Wax-
man & Bart Stupak, House of Representatives Comm. on Energy & Commerce, to Tony Hay-
ward, CEO, BP 1–2 (June 14, 2010), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/ 
documents/20100614/Hayward.BP.2010.6.14.pdf. 
26 The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling’s 
(“the Oil Spill Commission”) preliminary discussion of whether BP cut corners to save 
time and money sparked debate on that issue. Compare John M. Broder, Investigator Finds 
No Evidence That BP Took Shortcuts to Save Money, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2010, at A16 (noting 
conclusions of Commission investigator Fred H. Bartlit, Jr.), with Ayesha Rascoe, Serious 
Errors, Complacency Preceded U.S. Spill—Panel, Reuters, Nov. 9, 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0928572720101109 (noting comments by the Oil 
Spill Commission’s co-chairs that “the panel’s investigators did not find evidence that indi-
vidual workers sacrificed safety over monetary concerns, but that does not mean that the 
companies involved placed enough emphasis on safety”). The Oil Spill Commission’s Final 
Report notes that many decisions made by BP and its contractors that saved the companies 
significant time and money also increased the risk of a blowout.  BP Commission Report, 
supra note 1, at 125. 
27 See Clifford Krauss, Shell Presses for Drilling in Arctic, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2010, at B1. 
Shell’s vice president for Alaska, in explaining why Shell believes it should be allowed to 
drill in the Arctic and that its response plan is adequate, said, “[w]e’re not a tone-deaf 
company . . . . We’ve really got to be compelling in what we are doing.” Id. Shell’s response 
includes an upgrade of its rig’s blowout preventer, a subsea containment system, and a rig 
at the ready to drill a relief well. Id.; see also Press Release, Chevron, New Oil Spill Con-
tainment System to Protect Gulf of Mexico Planned by Major Oil Companies ( July 21, 
2010), available at http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/07212010_new 
oil spillcontainmentsystemtoprotectgulfofmexicoplannedbymajoroilcompanies.news. 
28 See BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 234–35; Alyson Flournoy et al., Ctr. 
for Progressive Reform, White Paper No. 1007, Regulatory Blowout: How Regula-
tory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible, and How the System Can be Fixed to 
Avoid a Recurrence 1–3, 13 (2010). 
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lied heavily on industry self-regulation.29 Investigation in the wake of 
the blowout has revealed that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(OCSLA)—the law governing development of federally owned oil and 
gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf—included few standards 
to assure protection of health, safety, and the environment.30 Addition-
ally, the Minerals Management Service’s (MMS) approach to regulation 
under the OCSLA relied heavily on standards developed by and volun-
tarily agreed to by industry.31 Of course, even with this weak regulatory 
regime, the threat of tort liability should have provided industry with 
an incentive to take steps to avoid catastrophic risk.32 However, it seems 
clear from most accounts that BP and its contractors failed to accurately 
assess the severity of the risks they faced.33 Thus, relying on industry, 
market forces, and the tort liability system to deter similar conduct 
seems unwarranted and an abdication of government’s role in protect-
ing health, safety, and the environment. 
 Both Congress and the Obama Administration showed initial in-
terest in and took action to promote relevant reforms. Congress held 
extensive hearings and considered reforms to the OCSLA that would 
have: imposed more rigorous standards for BOPs; tightened standards 
for review of the risks associated with exploration plans and drilling 
permits; improved technical capacity for the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), the successor 
agency to MMS; enabled better monitoring and enforcement of exist-
ing law; and provided greater consideration of environmental im-
                                                                                                                      
29 Flournoy et al., supra note 28, at 1–3, 13. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 12–20. 
32 See generally Alyson Flournoy, et. al., Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Pa-
per No. 1101, The BP Catastrophe: When Hobbled Law and Hollow Regulation 
Leave Americans Unprotected (2011), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/ 
articles/BP_Catastrophe_1101.pdf (pointing to other factors that have blunted the effects 
of tort law and regulatory disincentives for risky or reckless behavior). Moreover, the use of 
dispersants may literally and figuratively dilute the force of potential tort and statutory 
liability by making natural resource damages extremely difficult, if not impossible, to as-
sess. See generally Mark Schleifstein, Dispersant Was in Deepwater Oil Plume for 2 Months After 
BP’s Gulf Well Was Capped, Study Shows, Times-Picyaune, Jan. 27, 2011, http://www.nola.com/ 
news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2011/01/study_shows_dispersant_in_deep.html. 
33 See Broder, supra note 26 (noting the numerous flaws and errors that contributed to 
the disaster). “‘The interesting question is why these experienced men out on that rig 
talked themselves into believing that this was a good test that indicated well integrity,’ said 
Sean Grimsley, one of Mr. Bartlit’s deputies. ‘None of them wanted to die or jeopardize 
their safety. The question is why.’” Id. Possible explanations for this type of misperception 
of risk are discussed at infra Part II.A. 
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pacts.34 A bill known as the Consolidated Land Energy and Aquatic Re-
sources (CLEAR) Act that incorporated these reforms passed the 
House of Representatives; however, it stalled in the Senate and will cer-
tainly not be revived in the current Congress.35 
 Within the executive branch, BOEMRE has undertaken regulatory 
reform initiatives.36 The agency has promulgated regulations, including 
one designed to address drilling safety, and a workplace safety rule re-
quiring development of a Safety and Environmental Management Sys-
tem, and has created an Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee.37 
These regulatory reforms, like the proposed legislative reforms, are 
closely connected to the events that led to the blowout, and rather nar-
rowly focused.38 They illustrate that the executive branch, at least, is 
attempting to actively learn some of the obvious lessons that emerge 
from the specific facts leading up to the disaster.39 
 In addition to reforms to regulatory standards, early administrative 
and legislative proposals also focused on institutional flaws in the struc-
ture and culture of MMS that produced lax agency oversight of BP. A 
series of reports and accounts has documented a relationship in which 
MMS was dependent on industry, invested in promotion of drilling, 
and a reluctant regulator.40 In response, the Department of the Interior 
                                                                                                                      
 
34 Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534, 111th 
Cong. §§ 102(e)(4)–(5), 205(a)(8), 208(b)–(e), 212 (2010). 
35 Id.; Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 3534, Libr. of Congress, 
Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.03534: (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011) (noting last major action was placement on Senate Legislative Calendar on August 4, 
2010); Matthew Jaffe and John R. Parkinson, BP Gulf Oil Spill 1-Year Anniversary; Congress Yet to 
Pass Any Major Laws on Oil and Gas Drilling, ABC News, April 20, 2011, http://abcnews. 
go.com/Politics/bp-gulf-oil-spill-year-anniversary-congressional-inaction/story?id=13419389. 
36 See Interior OCS Safety Report, supra note 23, at 1–2. 
37 See Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation & Enforcement (BOEMRE), 
Fact Sheet: The Drilling Safety Rule 1–2 [hereinafter Drilling Safety], available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=457
92; BOEMRE, Fact Sheet: Workplace Safety Rule 1–2 [hereinafter Workplace 
Safety], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/ 
getfile&PageID=45791; BOEMRE, Regulation & Enforcement, Ocean Energy Safety 
Advisory Committee Charter 1, available at http://www.boemre.gov/mmab/PDF/Com- 
mitteeCharter.pdf. 
38 See Drilling Safety, supra note 37, at 2; Workplace Safety, supra note 37, at 1. 
39 See Drilling Safety, supra note 37, at 1; Workplace Safety, supra note 37, at 1. I 
use the term active learning as it is employed by Brian Toft and Simon Reynolds in Learn-
ing from Disasters: A Management Approach, to refer to learning where lessons are put into 
practice, as distinguished from passive learning, where knowledge is gained but no reme-
dial action occurs. Toft & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 66. 
40 See Interior OCS Safety Report, supra note 23, at 11, 68; Office of the Inspector 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Investigative Report: Island Operating Company et 
al. 3 (2010), available at http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/IslandOper- 
288 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 38:281 
has changed the leadership, structure, and name of MMS, and rein-
forced ethical standards for its employees.41 These steps were designed 
to change the culture within the agency and to eliminate conflicts of 
interest that had permeated MMS. The conflicts were the inevitable 
result of the agency’s role in promoting oil and gas leasing and collect-
ing revenues on the one hand, while acting as regulator and enforcer, 
on the other. By separating these functions, assigning new leadership, 
and re-branding the agency, Secretary Salazar has clearly sought to 
change the agency’s relationship with industry.42 Interior has the 
power, and appears to have the will, to address the most basic conflicts 
and ethical lapses, making it likely these narrow lessons will be learned. 
                                                                                                                     
 All of these lessons are important and the Administration’s re-
sponses are a positive sign. However, they are specific lessons of the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster, just as double hulls and the need for statu-
tory liability were lessons specific to the Exxon Valdez.43 Reforms based 
on these lessons made a repeat of the Exxon Valdez disaster less likely, 
but did little to avoid the BP disaster. Moreover, in light of Congress’s 
inaction and its apparent loss of interest in reform, it is not certain that 
even the specific lessons of the BP disaster will be learned. The CLEAR 
Act languished in the Senate after criticism by the oil industry and its 
supporters in Congress that it was overly broad.44 And the National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling’s 
(the “Oil Spill Commission”) detailed recommendations in its final re-
 
atingCo.pdf; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-313, Oil and Gas Manage-
ment: Interior’s Oil and Gas Production Verification Efforts Do Not Provide 
Reasonable Assurance of Accurate Measurement of Production Volumes 1–3 (2010), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10313.pdf. 
41 Interior OCS Safety Report, supra note 23, at 1–2. 
42 See U.S. Sec’y of the Interior, Order No. 3299, Establishment of the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.eenews.net/public/25/ 
15769/features/documents/2010/05/19/document_pm_03.pdf; Noelle Straub, Interior 
Unveils Plans to Split MMS into 3 Agencies, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes. 
com/gwire/2010/05/20/20greenwire-interior-unveils-plan-to-split-mms-into-3-agen-72654. 
html. 
43 Gail Counsell, Heading for Rougher Water: Unlimited Liability for Accidents in the US Will 
Worsen the Plight of the World’s Tanker Operators, Writes Gail Counsell, Independent (London), 
Jan. 10, 1993, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/heading-for-rougher-water-
unlimited-liability-for-accidents-in-the-us-will-worsen-the-plight-of-the-worlds-tanker-operators-
writes-gail-counsell-1477738.html; John H. Chusman Jr., Oil Spill Compromise Calls for Double 
Hulls, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1990, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html? 
res=9C0CE7DC1338F930A25754C0A966958260&scp=1&sq=double%20hulls&st=cse. 
44 See e.g., Press Release, Cathy Landry, American Petroleum Institute, House Re-
sources Bill Threatens American Jobs, Economy ( July 15, 2010), available at http://new. 
api.org/Newsroom/hrbilljobseconomy.cfm. 
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port have failed to generate any significant response by Congress or 
industry. 
II. Meta-Lessons: Lessons to Learn Beyond the BP Disaster 
 Even if government and industry were to learn all they could from 
the specifics of this disaster, this Article suggests three important 
broader lessons that this disaster should teach that are likely to remain 
unlearned. I call these meta-lessons because they are lessons about how 
we need to learn from this and other disasters, not just what we need to 
learn. This learning would require a look beyond the specific facts that 
proximately caused the disaster. The three meta-lessons are to endeavor 
to: (1) learn from the next disaster; (2) learn from the blueprint of the 
disaster; and (3) learn from the context of the disaster. 
A. How to Learn from the Next Disaster: Law and Regulatory Reform to 
Prevent a Future Disaster 
 The first lesson is not simply to react to the current disaster, but to 
think about the next one. Legislative reform in the wake of disaster in-
evitably and appropriately must begin from the contours of the imme-
diate problem. Indeed, it is hard enough to determine how to prevent 
identical mistakes from happening in the future, and virtually impossi-
ble to predict the precise contours of the next tragedy that may occur. 
Yet, reactive reform that focuses only on the facts of the BP disaster 
leaves us vulnerable to future incidents that result from similar cracks, 
foundational and otherwise, in the U.S. law and policy structure. This 
Article suggests that adaptive learning can help spot relevant patterns 
and more likely avoid a series of painful and costly mistakes.45 
 As noted above, in the wake of the BP disaster, it took little time for 
officials, industry, and the public to conclude that the risks inherent in 
the lax regulation of BOPs created an obvious and unacceptable catas-
trophic risk.46 However, an exclusive focus on the specific facts and 
technical dimensions of the BP disaster may overlook underlying pre-
                                                                                                                      
45 There is debate among social scientists on the value of organizational learning. 
Those who adopt High Reliability Theory believe that organizations can contribute signifi-
cantly to preventing accidents, whereas those who propound Normal Accident Theory—
which posits that accidents are inevitable in complex, tightly coupled systems—see less 
value in learning. See Jos A. Rijpma, Complexity, Tight-Coupling and Reliability: Connecting 
Normal Accidents Theory and High Reliability Theory, 5 J. Contingencies & Crisis Mgmt. 15, 
15 (1997) (suggesting the two theories are not always in conflict and both posit some role 
for learning). 
46 See BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 114–15. 
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conditions that made the series of errors, bad judgments, and technical 
failures more likely. Social scientists who study human-caused disasters 
emphasize that disasters cannot be understood purely in technical 
terms.47 Rather, disasters arise from an interaction between technologi-
cal and organizational system failings.48 
 There is much to learn about preventing disasters from the work of 
social scientists who study the causes of disaster and how organizations 
can learn from disasters. There are various theoretical approaches and 
lessons, but many common threads. Much of this work builds on Barry 
Turner’s “man-made disasters” model, which posits that disasters result 
from “an interaction between the human and organizational arrange-
ments of the socio-technical systems set up to manage complex and ill-
structured risk problems.”49 This disaster model highlights the role 
played by “a discrepancy between some deteriorating but ill-structured 
state of affairs and the culturally ‘taken for granted’: or more specifically 
the cultural norms, assumptions and beliefs adopted by an organization 
or industry for dealing with hazard and danger.”50 
 In the aftermath of the BP disaster, this suggests a line of inquiry 
well beyond reforms to mandate better BOPs and offers lessons both for 
industry and governance learning. The facts revealed to date suggest 
that both MMS and industry routinely underestimated risks and failed 
to heed warning signals.51 Turner and his successors emphasize this as a 
common feature of disasters. Turner coined the term disaster “incuba-
tion period” to describe “the accumulation of an unnoticed set of events 
which are at odds with the accepted beliefs about hazards and the 
norms for their avoidance.”52 During this period, a “build-up of latent 
errors and events, at odds with the culturally taken for granted, is ac-
companied by a collective failure of organizational cognition and ‘intel-
ligence.’”53 This account seems consistent with the conclusions of the 
Oil Spill Commission and suggests the value of understanding how 
these failures occur.54 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 16. 
48 See id.; see also Diane Vaughan, Autonomy, Interdependence, and Social Control: NASA and 
the Space Shuttle Challenger, 35 Admin. Sci. Q. 225, 225–26 (1990) (analyzing the role of 
organizational failures in the Challenger disaster). 
49 Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 16. 
50 Id. at 18 (describing Turner’s model). 
51 See BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 89–127. 
52 Barry Turner, Man-Made Disasters, 85 tbl.5.1 (1978). 
53 Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 17; see Broder, supra note 26. 
54 See BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 115–27, 223–24. 
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 In their book, Learning from Disasters, Brian Toft and Simon Rey-
nolds describe a variety of “socio-psychological pathologies that can af-
fect one’s ability to perceive the world appropriately.”55 First, contrary to 
popular assumptions, risk is a subjective and not an objective concept.56 
It is defined by social and individual reference schemes.57 Therefore, 
judgment and values affect individual perception of risk.58 Decision 
makers may also be overconfident because they expunge potentially 
dangerous events from their minds and thus fail to anticipate them ac-
curately.59 
 Socio-psychological phenomena can similarly prevent learning 
from mistakes after a disaster. There is some evidence that people pre-
fer to learn from the potential confirmation of their own hypothesis, 
rather than by eliminating hypotheses.60 The desire to seek out evi-
dence confirming one’s own hypothesis, while failing to accept chal-
lenges to it, can make it difficult for people and organizations to learn 
from their mistakes.61 Additionally, the concept of hindsight bias may 
incline those seeking to learn from others’ mistakes to be overly confi-
dent that they could have avoided the same error.62 And the group-
think phenomenon, described by Professor Irving Janis, leads to the 
“development of group norms that bolster morale at the expense of 
critical thinking.”63 This can impair the ability of individuals within an 
organization to make sound judgments by creating a sense of compul-
sion to avoid questioning the view of the majority.64 
 Foresight is inevitably limited. Hence, to address some of these 
human and organizational patterns, Pidgeon and O’Leary suggest that 
organizations should engage in “safety imagination.”65 Safety imagina-
tion is essential to ensure that “understanding and analysis of events . . . 
not become overly fixed within prescribed patterns of thinking . . . .”66 
To develop a critical and self-reflective process, these authors suggest 
that organizations must: extend the scope of potential scenarios that 
                                                                                                                      
55 Toft & Reynolds, supra note 11, 1–9. 
56 See id. at 2. 
57 Id. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. at 4. 
60 Id. at 4–5. 
61 Toft & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 4. 
62 Id. at 5–6. 
63 Id. at 6. 
64 Id. at 7–8. 
65 Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 22. 
66 Id. 
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are considered relevant; counter complacency; recognize that ill-
structured hazards are, by definition, accompanied by uncertainty; and 
step beyond institutional or cultural assumptions about hazards and 
their consequences.67 
 A common recommendation for organizational reform is to en-
hance institutional resilience.68 Building resilience demands that an 
organization develop a process of continual inquiry and adaptive learn-
ing,69 and a culture of effective communications.70 A number of schol-
ars emphasize the importance of a safety culture and point to organiza-
tional learning as a key to developing a safety culture, themes also 
developed in the Oil Spill Commission’s final report.71 
 The report of the Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board 
shows signs of recognizing the importance of an agency “culture of 
safety in which protecting human life and preventing environmental 
disasters are the highest priority, with the goal of making leasing and 
production safer and more sustainable.”72 However, this description of a 
“culture of safety” suggests a more limited undertaking than does the 
term safety culture. A “culture of safety” may simply mean prioritizing 
safety, rather than a more fundamental transformation of agency cul-
ture and procedures to incorporate adaptive learning. Scholars caution 
against trying to create administrative control as the sole response to 
disaster.73 In other words, while better standards and enforcement for 
BOPs and cement casings are needed,74 relying on improved standards 
alone will not help prevent future disasters most effectively. A culture 
that promotes imaginative thinking and adaptive responses is also 
needed. Whether BOEMRE will create this type of safety culture re-
mains to be seen. The challenge of developing policies to promote such 
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. at 23; see also Toft & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 9. 
68 See Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 17; Nick Pidgeon, The Limits to Safety? Cul-
ture, Politics, Learning and Man-Made Disasters, 5 J. Contingencies & Crisis Mgmt. 1, 1 
(1997). 
69 See Comfort, supra note 10, at 344–47; Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 18. 
70 See Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 18. 
71 See Toft & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 25–26; Barry A. Turner, The Development of A 
Safety Culture, 7 Chemistry & Industry 241, 241–44 (1991); Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra 
note 10, at 27; BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 224–29. 
72 Interior OCS Safety Report, supra note 23, at 7 (describing the purpose of a broad 
safety culture program: “to create and maintain industry, worker, and regulator awareness 
of, and commitment to, measures that will achieve human safety and environmental pro-
tection, and to make sure that where industry fails, BOEMRE will respond with strong 
enforcement authorities”). 
73 See Comfort, supra note 10, at 344. 
74 See BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 152. 
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a culture within industry is significant. Creating such a culture requires 
a commitment to a long-term process of organizational learning.75 
 Another important dimension of learning from disasters is the 
need for learning to extend beyond the organizations directly involved. 
Toft and Reynolds emphasize that organizations need to engage not 
just in organization-specific learning, but also in isomorphic learning— 
that is, learning from “occasions on which organizations or their sub-
units, whether engaged in disparate enterprises or not, exhibit similar 
patterns of behavior.”76 
 Building networks of organizations and paying careful attention to 
the flow of information among them is also important.77 Because the 
ability to learn from mistakes depends on organizational ability to en-
gage in meaningful critique of past performance, eliminating disincen-
tives to sharing key information is a central focus for improving organi-
zations’ response to disasters.78 Pidgeon and O’Leary suggest strategies 
for overcoming these barriers, drawing on the experience of aviation 
incident and event monitoring in Great Britain. Their analysis high-
lights the importance of identifying “how a reporting or monitoring 
system can be successfully embedded within the local social and politi-
cal contexts.”79 Designing these systems to create strong incentives for 
reporting, while still providing for accountability and responsibility, is a 
critical goal. Key decisions include: who has access to the information, 
whether reporting will be anonymous or confidential, what categories 
of errors are covered, the standards of error that may trigger discipli-
nary or other sanctions, when confidentiality can be overridden, and 
                                                                                                                      
75 Toft & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 29.  The Commission called for “the oil and gas 
industry’s internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a funda-
mental transformation of its safety culture.” BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 217. 
The Commission provided valuable information to enable such a transformation, drawing 
on the experiences of the nuclear energy and aviation industries and the Navy’s nuclear 
submarine program. Id. at 229–39. However, there is no sign to date that industry has 
taken meaningful action in this direction. 
76 See Toft & Reynolds, supra note 11, at 68, 72–75. 
77 See BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 123–24; Comfort, supra note 10, at 344, 
348–49.  
78 See Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 19–24; see also Mary Jane Angelo, Stumbling 
Toward Success: A Story of Adaptive Law and Ecological Resilience, 87 Neb. L. Rev. 950 (2009). 
Angelo’s case study of the massive pesticide release caused by an agency’s restoration pro-
ject at Lake Apopka, Florida, provides a positive example where various factors led the 
agency to admit mistakes and pursue an adaptive strategy. Id. at 966–70, 994–96. However, 
the case study also highlights challenges, and the pressures on agencies not to admit fail-
ure. Id. 
79 See BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 254; Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, 
at 24. 
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what steps will be taken to correct deficiencies that are identified.80 
Pidgeon and O’Leary emphasize the importance of trust relationships 
in designing information sharing and reporting systems.81 
 Secretary Salazar has suggested creating an Ocean Energy Safety 
Institute in the Department of the Interior, drawing on expertise from 
the Department of Energy and the Coast Guard, as well as academic 
experts.82 Additionally, the Commission and Outer Continental Shelf 
Safety Oversight Board have conducted wide-ranging interviews with 
experts and agency personnel. These efforts could help to identify the 
existing structures, patterns, and norms in federal oversight agencies 
and industry, and help to inform a more systematic effort to create a 
safety culture. Unfortunately, all the reform efforts to date appear to 
remain fairly tightly focused on the BP disaster itself. The Oil Spill 
Commission makes important broader recommendations to promote 
ongoing learning, including creation of an independent industry-wide 
safety organization to supplement government regulation and broader 
administrative and legislative reforms.83  However, as noted above, nei-
ther Congress nor industry seems engaged by these overtures. 
 Reform that is focused on how to learn better from disasters in the 
future is needed. This task is in many ways more challenging than 
thinking about specific reforms, and lacks the urgency and salience of 
the narrower responses. Such learning demands more nuanced study 
and analysis of how communication occurs among the relevant agen-
cies and industry, the incentives for individuals to report accidents and 
near misses, and how decisions are made through the chain of com-
mand. Acting on this broader challenge also requires more fundamen-
tal changes in agency behavior and procedures than do narrower re-
forms. Its benefits are more diffuse and less likely to attract public 
notice and reinforcement, not to mention funding from Congress. 
Thus, it seems very possible that this disaster will pass without learning 
of this sort. However, as the country reels from a sequence of events 
including 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, the financial crisis, and the BP dis-
                                                                                                                      
80 Pidgeon & O’Leary, supra note 10, at 25. The authors note that when the Federal 
Aviation Administration gave pilots immunity from prosecution for voluntary reporting of 
air-miss reports in 1968, the number of reports almost tripled. Id. When the immunity 
guarantee was subsequently revoked in 1971, reportings dropped back below pre-1968 
levels. Id. 
81 Id. at 24–25. 
82 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Proposes Ocean Energy Safety Insti-
tute (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Proposes-Ocean-Energy-
Safety-Institute.cfm. 
83 BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 215–65. 
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aster in the space of a decade, we would be wise to develop better ca-
pacity within agencies to reduce the risk of disasters by learning about 
how to learn from them. 
B. How To Learn from the Blueprint of the Disaster: Hollow Government 
 Beyond building agency and industry capacity to avoid and learn 
from disasters, a second way to learn from the BP disaster is to step 
back and look at its political, regulatory, and economic context. With a 
step back, one can see a blueprint not only for this disaster, but other 
crises as well. 
 This blueprint for disaster is what Professor Rena Steinzor has 
called “hollow government” —government that has been stripped of 
the resources, authority, and respect it needs in order to effectively pro-
tect public health, safety, and the environment.84 Think of a pumpkin 
that has been hollowed out, the flesh and seeds cut out, leaving only an 
empty shell. Too many of the agencies that the public relies on to pro-
tect it have been similarly gutted—the result of two decades of deregu-
latory policies and an ideology that prizes small government over good 
government.85 This ideology has held sway only by maintaining the illu-
sion that the country can always cut taxes more and still have adequate 
services.86 The 2010 elections and extension of the Bush tax cuts sug-
gest that this ideology and illusion continue to dominate, perhaps with 
greater force than ever.87 
 In their paper, Regulatory Dysfunction: How Insufficient Resources, 
Outdated Laws, and Political Interference Cripple the Protector Agencies, the 
authors identify the causes of hollow government and the steps needed 
to remedy it.88 Their analysis highlights outdated authorizing statutes, 
severe shortfalls in funding, and political interference as three major 
factors in hollow government;89 all conditions that characterized the 
regulation of oil drilling on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). 
                                                                                                                      
84 See Steinzor, supra note 19, at 21–23, 44; see also Sidney Shapiro, Rena Steinzor & 
Matthew Shudtz, Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Paper No. 906, Regulatory 
Dysfunction: How Insufficient Resources, Outdated Laws, and Political Inter-
ference Cripple the ‘Protector Agencies’ 5 (2009). 
85 See Shapiro, Steinzor & Shudz, supra note 84, at 3–5 (documenting this phe-
nomenon in numerous federal agencies, including FDA and EPA, among others); BP 
Commission Report, supra note 1, at 72–76. 
86 See Shapiro et al., supra note 84, at 5–7. 
87 See Peter Baker, With New Tax Bill, a Turning Point for the President, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
18, 2010, at A13. 
88 See Shapiro, Steinzor & Shudz, supra note 84, at 5, 17–19. 
89 Id. at 6, 9, 12. 
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1. Outdated Authorizing Statutes 
 Following the Macondo well blowout, the OCSLA came under 
close public scrutiny for the first time in decades. The lack of meaning-
ful mandates to protect human health, safety, and the environment 
were glaringly apparent in the wake of the disaster. The OCSLA was 
enacted to promote and provide a framework for exploitation of the 
federal oil and gas resources on the OCS.90 Although its section on 
policies mentions environment and safety,91 the statute contains few 
mandates for meaningful protection of these values.92 Similarly, the 
procedures for environmental review fail to provide an effective frame-
work for analyzing the risks of OCS oil exploration and drilling.93 The 
statute’s penalty provisions are extremely modest and, despite statuto-
rily mandated adjustments for inflation, remain at a level unlikely to 
deter risky conduct.94 In 1995, Congress passed amendments to the 
OCSLA to provide greater incentives for deepwater drilling.95 Yet, it 
failed at that time to revisit the safety and environmental protections of 
the OCSLA to take account of the dramatic shift from shallow to deep-
water drilling, and the ongoing move towards ultra-deepwater drill-
ing.96 The result is an agency whose mandate is out of date and fails to 
take adequate account of public safety, health, and the environment. 
                                                                                                                      
 
90 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended 
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a (2006)) (stating that the purpose of the Act is “to provide for the 
jurisdiction of the United States over the submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf, 
and to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease such lands for certain purposes.”) 
91 See 43 U.S.C. § 1332(5)–(6). 
92 See Flournoy et al., supra note 28, at 12–20 (discussing the provisions in the OCSLA, 
their shortcomings, and recommendations for reform). 
93 See id. at 16–19. 
94 See Interior OCS Safety Report, supra note 23, at 18. The current maximum pen-
alty for violations is $35,000 per day. See 43 U.S.C. § 1350; 30 CFR § 250.1403 (2010). Forty-
one percent of BOEMRE employees responding to a survey by the Outer Continental 
Shelf Safety Oversight Board believed these sanctions were not an effective deterrent in an 
environment where operators pay between $500,000 and $1,000,000 per day to operate a 
facility. Interior OCS Safety Report, supra note 23, at 18. 
95 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 104-58, §§ 301–306, 109 Stat. 557 
(1995) (enacted as amended 43 U.S.C. § 1337). 
96 See A Brief History of Offshore Oil Drilling 7–12 (Nat’l Comm’n. on the BP Deepwater Ho-
rizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Working Paper No. 1, 2010), available at http://www. 
oilspillcommission.gov/document/brief-history-offshore-oil-drilling (documenting the rapid 
and ongoing shift towards deeper water); Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Royalty Plan to Give Wind-
fall to Oil Companies, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 2006, at A1. Between 1985 and 2009, the number of 
deepwater wells increased from sixty-five to more than 600. The Role of the Interior Department in 
the Deepwater Horizon Disaster: Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2010) (opening statement of Rep. Bart Stupak), avail-
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2. Inadequate Funding 
 Repeated reports have documented how inadequate resources 
prevented MMS from effectively regulating offshore oil exploration 
and drilling. First, MMS, and now BOEMRE, have lacked adequate staff 
to perform meaningful inspections. Although OCS leasing increased by 
200% between 1982 and 2007, during the same time MMS staffing re-
sources decreased by 36%.97 Inspections are infrequent, rarely unan-
nounced, and can consist almost entirely of verifying paperwork.98 In-
spectors are hampered in issuing citations by the lack of such basic 
equipment as laptops.99 The Department of the Interior Inspector 
General and the Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board 
documented how lack of funding prevented MMS, and now BOEMRE, 
from hiring, training, and retaining staff.100 In addition, reports have 
consistently found that MMS lacked the technical expertise and capac-
ity to develop regulations adequate to protect public health and safety 
and the environment. Reports by the Government Accountability Of-
fice and the Department of the Interior’s Acting Inspector General 
characterized MMS as dependent on industry’s greater expertise with 
the technology of deepwater and ultra-deepwater drilling, and thus re-
liant on industry’s judgment of appropriate safeguards to incorporate 
in regulations.101 Although MMS was charged with regulating an ex-
tremely sophisticated industry, in which technology has increased the 
level and complexity of the monitoring and knowledge needed for ef-
fective regulation, its budget remained relatively flat.102 
                                                                                                                      
 
able at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100720/Stupak.State- 
ment.07.20.2010.pdf. 
97 Interior OCS Safety Report, supra note 23, at 13. 
98 See id. at 8–9 (reporting that BOEMRE lacks a comprehensive handbook on inspec-
tions, inspectors were not required to witness operations, unannounced inspections were 
lacking, and some operators closed down parts of operations when inspectors arrive). 
99 Id. at 15. 
100 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-852T, Oil and Gas Management: 
Key Elements to Consider for Providing Assurance of Effective Independent 
Oversight 3 (2010) [hereinafter GAO Key Elements], available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new. items/d10852t.pdf; Hearing on The Deepwater Horizon Incident: Are the Minerals Manage-
ment Service Regulations Doing The Job?, Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Resources of 
the H. Comm. on Natural Resources 111th Cong. 3 (2010) [hereinafter Kendall Statement] 
(Statement of Mary L. Kendall, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior), 
available at http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/images/Documents/20100617/2010_06_17 
_ energy/testimony_kendall.pdf. 
101 GAO Key Elements, supra note 100; Kendall Statement, supra note 100 (indicating 
that MMS relied on industry to self report violations). 
102 See Flournoy, supra note 28, at 21–23; Role of the Interior Department in the Deepwater Ho-
rizon Disaster, Panel I of a Joint Hearing of the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the 
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 Adequate funding for research and investigation is essential to 
permit the agency to stay ahead of changing technology—instead of 
relying on industry representations regarding whether technology is 
safe or reliable. Although critically important, the odds are low that this 
long-term investment will emerge from the current budget process.103 
3. Political Interference 
 Political interference is both the third hallmark of hollow govern-
ment and the force that makes it unlikely that political leaders will fo-
cus on the hollow government blueprint. The wealth of the large oil 
companies is almost impossible to conceive. The big five oil compa-
nies—BP, Chevron, Conoco Phillips, ExxonMobil, and Shell—made a 
combined profit of $100 billion in 2008, despite the collapse of oil 
prices in the fourth quarter at the onset of the global financial crisis.104 
Even with the recent estimates that BP’s liability from the disaster will 
reach $40 billion, BP reported a $1.785 billion profit for the third quar-
ter of 2010.105 
 This wealth is a powerful force that industry deploys to influence 
both the composition of the legislature and the legislation that emerges 
from Congress. Campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry 
in 2010 were reported by the Center for Responsive Politics as exceed-
ing $23 million, down from the 2008 levels of over $35 million.106 The 
Center’s website also reports that the big five oil companies spent over 
$92 million on lobbying efforts in 2009, and the industry as a whole 
                                                                                                                      
Subcomm. on Energy and Env’t of the H. Energy and Commerce Comm. 111th Cong. (2010) (state-
ment of Rep. Bart Stupak, Chairman, H. Energy and Commerce Comm.) (discussing MMS’s 
failure to increase the number inspectors to correspond with the increase in the number of 
wells). 
103 Jaffe & Parkinson, supra note 35. 
104 Daniel J. Weiss & Alexandra Kougentakis, Big Oil Misers, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Mar. 
31, 2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/big_oil_misers.html/#2. 
105 BP, Group Results: Third Quarter and Nine Months 2010, at 1, available at 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/
B/bp_third_quarter_2010_results.pdf; Julia Werdigier, BP Forms Partnership to Explore in Rus-
sia, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 2011, at B1. 
106 Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Oil & Gas: Top Contributors to Federal Candidates, Parties, and Out-
side Groups, OpenSecrets, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.php?cycle=2010&ind=E01 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (showing total contributions for various election cycles, including 2008 
and 2010); see also Weiss & Kougentakis, supra note 104. The Center for Responsive Politics is a 
non-partisan, non-profit research group dedicated to tracking the influence of money in Washing-
ton. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Mission, OpenSecrets, http://www.opensecrets.org/about/ 
index.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
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spent over $175 million.107 According to the Center, there were a total 
of 781 lobbyists employed by the oil and gas industry in 2009, and 744 
in 2010.108 Almost two-thirds of these lobbyists had previously worked 
for the federal government.109 Both the oil and gas industries have op-
posed, and will continue to oppose, efforts at meaningful reform, in-
cluding attempts to strengthen statutes, agency rules, or the regulating 
agencies themselves.110 Absent meaningful campaign finance reform, it 
is unlikely that Congress or agencies will do more than respond to the 
most direct and concrete causes of the disaster. 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, which held that corporations are entitled to the same po-
litical speech rights as individuals, and invalidated campaign contribu-
tion restrictions in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, has 
increased the power of corporate interests.111 The huge increase in 
groups with anonymous contributors funding political advertisements 
in the most recent election cycle is likely a harbinger of the future.112 
 An incessant drumbeat for less regulation and smaller government 
has dominated political discourse for the last thirty years and remains 
stronger than ever with the push for drastic federal spending cuts.113 
Regulation and government are denigrated; deregulation, small gov-
ernment, and the market are praised. Hollow government is a result of 
this ideology, and the BP oil spill can be seen as a fruit of that anti-
                                                                                                                      
107 Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying: Oil & Gas Industry Profile 2010, OpenSecrets, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?lname=E01&year=2010 (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
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visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
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110 Mike Soraghan, BP, Other Oil Companies Opposed Effort to Stiffen Environmental, Safety 
Rules for Offshore Drilling, NY Times, April 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/ 
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113 See Carl Hulse, House Approves Republican Budget Plan to Cut Trillions, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
16, 2011, at A1 (reporting that Republicans “muscled through a budget plan that pares 
federal spending by an estimated $5.8 trillion over the next decade” with an overall plan to 
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will reverberate for a long time’” (quoting Sen. Charles Shumer)). 
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government ideology.114 This ideology conveniently focuses on gov-
ernment as the threat to the public, and ignores the power and politi-
cal influence that economic interests wield, often to the detriment of 
public health and safety, and the environment. This in turn shields the 
tremendous power of corporate interests from public view and makes it 
unlikely that the public will uncover the reality of and threat posed by 
hollow government. 
C. How to Learn from the Context of the Disaster: United States’ Energy Policy 
 A third meta-lesson from the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster is 
that the drilling of that particular offshore well is the result not just of 
private choice, but of a broader national policy on energy. MMS’s oil 
leasing and permitting decisions reflect executive branch decisions 
about the disposition of publicly owned oil and gas resources.115 BP’s 
decisions about exploration in that area were not made in a vacuum, 
but in the context of a set of laws and appropriations that create a vari-
ety of incentives that affect industry’s behavior. Thus, to understand 
why the disaster occurred, it would be wise to look at the policy context 
that has produced the increasing rush to develop oil resources in 
deepwater, and increasingly in ultra-deepwater—areas that increase the 
complexity, risks, and uncertainty of drilling operations and potential 
accidents.116 The most visible leadership on this issue comes from 
statements of the Oil Spill Commission and its Co-Chair Bob Graham, 
who has repeatedly noted that the lack of an energy policy is an impor-
tant issue related to the work of the Oil Spill Commission and one that 
must be addressed by the legislative and executive branches.117 
                                                                                                                      
114 See Greg Hitt & Stephen Power, The Gulf Oil Spill: Lawmakers Eager to Take Action, 
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chairmen-william-k-reilly-and-senator-bob-graham-dec-3-deliberative-meeting; William K. Reilly 
& Sen. Bob Graham, Co-Chairmen, Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & 
Offshore Drilling, Opening Remarks: Dec. 2 Deliberative Meeting (Dec. 2, 2010), available at 
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 The current energy policy provides hefty subsidies for the highly 
profitable oil and gas industries to continue with their unwavering fo-
cus on producing more oil and gas.118 Although some say that the 
United States lacks an energy policy, it is more accurate to say that our 
leaders don’t clearly articulate the operative energy policy. Perhaps this 
is because it is not a coherent one or because on close inspection it is 
difficult to justify in light of other stated priorities. 
 A primary and often overlooked component of energy policy is the 
national policy on the privatization of public natural resources. U.S. 
policy is to give away its natural resources at bargain prices presumably 
to promote exploitation and development.119 A 2008 report by the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office compared U.S. royalty rates to those of 
103 other jurisdictions, and only eleven had royalty rates lower than 
those of the United States.120 Moreover, the Government Accountabil-
ity Office has made repeated reports of problems with uncollected roy-
alties and with MMS’s royalty-in-kind program that has led to underes-
timation of the royalties owed.121 
                                                                                                                     
 Another significant component of the national energy policy is tax 
policy that directly affects investment in oil extraction. A 2005 Congres-
sional Budget Office Report showed that many capital investments for 
oil extraction are taxed at a rate of nine percent, which ranks among 
 
118 See Anne C. Mulkern, Oil Industry, Green Groups Launch Dueling Ad Campaigns, N.Y. 
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Protection, 10 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 70, 70 (2001). 
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Federal System for Collecting Oil and Gas Revenues Needs Comprehensive Reas-
sessment 11 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08691.pdf. 
121 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-556T, Oil and Gas Management: 
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www.gao.gov/new.items/d09556t.pdf; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-744, 
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Its Share of Gas, Resulting in Millions in Forgone Revenue 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09744.pdf. 
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the lowest rates for any industry.122 Tax deductions and credits for the 
oil extraction industry amount to roughly $4 billion per year.123 
 Looked at as a whole, the current energy policy strongly encour-
ages all-out exploitation of remaining domestic fossil fuel resources, 
and deepwater oil reserves in particular. If the public and elected offi-
cials believe that the risks that produced the Macondo Well blowout are 
unacceptable, an energy policy that will move us towards a clean energy 
path is a logical response. This could include increased government 
support for lower carbon, lower-risk energy paths. 
 Despite the clear political opportunity provided by the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster for the President and Congress to focus attention on a 
broad clean energy policy, there have been few signs of any significant 
movement in that direction.124 The CLEAR Act included provisions 
that would eliminate some of the royalty relief for deepwater drilling, 
eliminate the disastrous royalty-in-kind program, and require BOEMRE 
to study global royalty payments to inform U.S. royalty policy.125 These 
are very positive steps that would reduce the mindless incentives for 
deepwater drilling and the unintended windfalls to oil companies. 
However, that Act has languished in the Senate. Moreover, even those 
proposed changes fail to address the broader question of whether pol-
icy should create incentives towards a cleaner energy path. In the wake 
of the November 2010 election, it seems highly unlikely that the Ad-
ministration or Congress will have interest in this topic.126 
Conclusion 
 There is much that can be learned from the BP Deepwater Hori-
zon disaster. Unfortunately, even learning the most specific lessons has 
proved a contentious and uncertain process. This Article suggests first 
that both industry and government must fundamentally rethink their 
approaches to safety and develop a culture that encourages and facili-
tates learning from mistakes. Second, it identifies the phenomenon of 
                                                                                                                      
122 Cong. Budget Office, Taxing Capital Income: Effective Rates and Approaches 
to Reform 7–8, 11 tbl.2 (2005), available at http://www. cbo.gov/ftpdocs/67xx/doc6792/ 
10–18-Tax.pdf. 
123 Mulkern, supra note 118. 
124 See Hitt & Power, supra note 114; see also BP Commission Report, supra note 1, at 
305 (recommending a national oil policy that will “direct the nation toward a . . . more 
sustainable environment”). 
125 See Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534, 
111th Cong. §§ 217, 206, 219 (2010). 
126 See John M. Broder, Tougher Rules Urged for Offshore Drilling, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2011, 
A12. 
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hollow government, characterized by government lacking the resources 
and authority to protect the public interest and a policy process domi-
nated by powerful economic interests, as a root cause of the BP disaster 
and a contributing factor to other recent national disasters, including 
the financial crisis. Hollow government also makes it unlikely that we 
will learn the third meta-lesson and address the longstanding need for 
a coherent energy policy. These lessons could help to avert future disas-
ters and better enable government to protect public health, safety, and 
the environment. However, absent changes to address the underlying 
obstacles to learning, there seems little likelihood that the lessons will 
be learned. 
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